objective account of a human whole. Each account, if it preserves the human quality at all, is a created product in which the human qualities of the creator-in the outside viewer and describer-are one ingredient. [Redfield 1960 [Redfield (1953 :136] While Redfield's position may have sounded hopelessly equivocal in the 1950s, by the late 1980s it is hardly novel. Landmarks in this change might be the influential work by Thomas Kuhn (1962) in the natural sciences, who argues that research is shaped by the particular paradigm of its time, and also the book by the psychologist Robert Rosenthal (1976) on the "Pygmalion Effect" and other factors creating observer bias. By now some form of the constructionist view is held by scholars in many disciplines (see Kemper 1981 , Davis and Mitchell 1985 , and Shweder and Miller 1985 .
The purpose of this article is to suggest that ethnographic disagreements present puzzles of the greatest importance. And there is an irony here that Pollner (1974 Pollner ( , 1975 ) has pointed out: it is only with the assumption of a shared reality ("mundane reasoning") that these disagreements ("reality disjunctures") take on significance as puzzles to be solved; there is a shared reality, true, but differing truths may indeed be said about it.
The charter image of this present enterprise is from a 1950 Japanese film made by Akira Kurosawa based on two short stories by Ryunosuke Akutagawa (Kurosawa 1969 ). The film is set in 12th-centuryJapan and concerns the encounter in the forest between a bandit and a samurai and his wife. The mystery of the film comes from four quite different accounts of the same event (a sexual encounter that may be rape, and a death that is either murder or suicide). Each account is clearly self-serving, intended to enhance the nobility of the teller. Each account is presented as a truth at a trial by the bandit, the samurai's wife, the samurai (who, having died, testifies through a spirit medium), and a passing woodcutter who may have been an onlooker. As each of the four testifies, we see that particular version of the events on film, so that the apparent truthfulness of the visual image supports each testimony in turn. But unlike the familiar detective story on film, where accounts that are later impeached are given only verbally, Rashomon commits itself to, and convinces us of, the truth of each version in turn. And unlike the detective story, we are not given an explanation wrapped up nicely in truth at the end.
I do not propose to take Rashomon as more than an allusion to the idea of contradictory truths.l It is at best a charter image for us, and certainly not a charter myth-deeper consideration of Kurosawa's film leads us too far afield, into consideration of art versus flim-flam versus paradoxical koan.
At the most superficial level, a confrontation between two ethnographers has all the attractions of a good fight, and nothing attracts attention quite like the sound of a colleague's mistakes being nailed to the wall. But the question of who is right and who is wrong in these confrontations is the least interesting one that we can raise. Certainly there are some senses in which an ethnographer may be just plain wrong, but even the mistaken ethnography has potential use. That is, even "mistakes" may be made to reveal something of importance about the culture concerned as well as about the background of the ethnographer.
Another proposition: Those realms of culture that generate disagreement are likely to be those that are most problematical and interesting. What these disagreements reveal about individual ethnographers is of ethnographical importance to the extent that the disagreements arise as the result of the ethnographer's membership in a group (as representative of his or her own culture, theoretical school, or the like).
But most important, the value of thinking about the Rashomon Effect goes far beyond the relatively few cases of ethnographic disagreement that we shall be able to turn up. The sorts of influences, biases, or predilections we can examine here are at work in all ethnography, even when it is unchallenged. And so what we learn from the special case of ethnographic disagreement can help us understand ethnography in general.
The following is a brief discussion of some reasons for disagreements between ethnographers.
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Someone is wrong
Probably most disagreements are not clearly resolvable (in the film Rashomon, someone did and others did not plunge the knife into the samurai's chest). The resolution may not be one of the two answers offered but some more complex mix (again, taking an example from Rashomon, there was probably sex between the bandit and the samurai's wife, but it may have been somewhere between rape and seduction). At any rate, even if we can satisfactorily determine that someone is wrong, we must go further to understand why.
I do not at all intend this to be a cavalier dismissal of truth or denial of the possibility of falsehood. Ethnographies can contain information that is wrong, whether through deliberate falsification or otherwise. Although Raoul Naroll and other hologeistic anthropologists working with the Human Relations Area Files have not been primarily concerned with ethnographic disagreement, they do deal with many of the same influences under discussion here. They generally focus on "the problem of ethnographic error" (Naroll 1970:928), and do not treat it as a puzzle of interpretation. They have been trying to identify and so control for ethnographer bias which results in errors in the ethnographies, because these errors compromise cross-cultural correlations. By their emphasis on error, they take a positivist position. Not surprisingly, the sorts of questions they ask of the ethnographies are especially vulnerable to false answers, in my view. For example, Naroll's most-cited finding concerns the presence or absence of witchcraft attribution (1962:153): ethnographers who spend longer in the field are more likely to report that deaths are attributed to witchcraft than those who spend a shorter time. One possible explanation of this is that the short-term researchers are simply wrong, that they missed an important fact. And indeed, presence or absence of witchcraft beliefs is about as close to a truly determinable fact as one could ask for.
They are looking at different cultures or subcultures
This problem is exemplified by the old tale of the blind men disagreeing about the nature of an elephant because each is touching a different part of the beast.
Confusion may arise from the use of one name for peoples who are quite different in important ways. But generalizing to an entire society on the basis of data from one subset of the population also happens often. I think particularly of gender differences (see McGoodwin 1978) , but in many societies there is enough class or occupational differentiation to create different views of the situation. This presumably would only result in disagreements if the source of the data was not specified and the generalizations were carelessly made.
They are referring to the same culture at different times
Surely no anthropologist can be unaware of changes over time, but sometimes when we create an ethnographic present we obscure the temporal origin of the data; Divale (1975) has emphasized the significance of this "temporal focus." I would suggest that part of the disagreement between Mead and Fortune about Arapesh warfare can be attributed to differences in time periods. Ember has addressed these two points, saying that "the main reason we should reject Freeman's attack on Mead is that his so-called evidence does not deal with the time and place that Mead described" (1985:906). And we are not just talking about linear time change, as exemplified in the Pacific by the landmarks of pacification and missionization. We also need to consider the possibility that the different ethnographers stepped into the culture at a different phase of a cultural cycle. The philosopher John Ladd (1957) e. What of different theoretical orientations or research plans? This is always the most obvious and most acknowledged influence, and should be the easiest to establish. The most dramatic example concerns the effect that the feminist movement has had on recent ethnography. It is not simply a matter of the gender of the ethnologist. Indeed, the data on gender effect are quite equivocal (see Divale 1976, Whyte 1978 , Martin 1978 . For example, Whyte (1978) found no evidence of gender bias in the specific area of reports on the status of women. But it does seem likely that, in general, male ethnographers (or better: ethnographers unaware of the feminist literature in anthropology) will tend to neglect women's roles in society. Abu Lughod, in her Bedouin ethnography, has tried to account for the effect of ideology and maleness on some of her ethnographic predecessors: The straw man gambit appears as a significant subset of these examples. It is immediately acknowledged but is in fact difficult to recognize and difficult to deal with. One cannot help but approach it with a bit of bemused cynicism. There are the studies that proclaim a new theoretical approach and demolish old ones, not so much for pressing scholarly demands but rather because of our need for individual achievement. In her Malinowski Memorial Lecture, Marilyn Strathern has discussed Malinowski's own use of such theoretical "straw men" (1981) . But the reason this subject is so difficult to deal with is because it raises questions of scholarly integrity that are not always very accessible, perhaps even to the principal. 
g. What of different lengths of time in the field? In his book on Data Quality Control (1962)
Raoul Naroll has suggested that witchcraft is more likely to be reported by ethnographers who stay longer than a year in the field than by those studying a shorter time. On the other hand, length of stay has no effect on reports of drunken brawling. Certainly on the whole, length of stay has an effect on the ethnography. But it is often surprisingly hard to pin down from the evidence published in an ethnography.
h. What of different knowledge of language, or knowledge of different languages? Surely this must make a difference, but how? On the basis of cross-cultural studies, Witkowski (1978) reported no effects for language ability of the ethnographer. But in the case of ethnographer's disagreements, relative language fluency would surely be a factor to be considered. I once heard two people who both claimed linguistic competence give drastically different translations of a phrase shouted at a ceremony. One claimed that it was an interesting symbolic reference, the other heard it as a call to take up arms against the central government.
And what of the difference between those New Guinea studies done in the vernacular and those done in pidgin English? It is hard to determine the linguistic basis of most ethnographies (or the linguistic competence of most ethnographers), but considering the short time so often spent in the field, I wonder if the ethnographer working in pidgin does not have a real advantage over one who spends time trying to learn the vernacular from scratch.
i. What of different degrees of rapport? This is like the previous factor, but even more difficult to deal with. We know from informal discussions (and gossip about) our colleagues that there are tremendous differences in the ways different ethnographers relate to the people they are studying. This should surely make a difference in the ethnography, but how?
These last three (g, h, i) have a status somewhat different from the other factors on the list, since they refer to relative deficiencies in ethnographic competence. The phrase "optimal fieldwork conditions" has been used (e.g., Witkowski 1978) to describe ethnographies based on a stay in the field of more than one year and a working knowledge of the field language. I think that we can agree that more fieldwork is better than less, more language better than less, and more rapport better than less, other things being equal (although a long chummy stay is not a guarantee of deep insight). 
